The Securities Act of 1933 prohibits the sale of securities unless they are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or are eligible for an exemption. The act thus prohibits a person from attempting to sell stock over the Internet unless that person is willing to incur the cost and delays associated with registration. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 creates a new registration exemption for offerings up to $1 million (each 12 months) which may be solicited in a limited way over the Internet. A variety of conditions apply, such as that the offering be conducted through an SEC-registered intermediary. This paper identifies the factors that led to the enactment of the JOBS Act, critiques the new exemption, and offers thoughts about its likely success.
INTRODUCTION
Small and start-up businesses are chronically starved for capital, a situation exacerbated by the lingering impact of the 2008 global nancial crisis. Yet it is widely believed that small businesses are the primary engines of economic growth and job formation, causing policymakers in the US and elsewhere to search for new ways to stoke those engines with investment. 1 is craving for funding must be placed in the context of America's zeal for get-rich-quick schemes, its near reverence for entrepreneurship, its trend toward deregulation, and its growing resentment that lucrative initial public o erings (IPOs) are only available to the wealthy and well-connected (e.g., Twitter 2 ). Add to the mix the realization that, through the ubiquitous Internet, the public is now e ortlessly joining to provide the resources to create works of art, assist the poor [2] , engage in science [3] , create an encyclopedia (Wikipedia) [4] , and develop innovative products [5] ; i.e., the world has awakened to the potentialities of "crowdsourcing."
Is it any wonder that edgling and would-be entrepreneurs began to envision raising capital using the same approach-by soliciting individually small investments 1 President Obama said in his 2012 State of the Union Message, "Most new jobs are created in start-ups and small businesses. So let's pass an agenda that helps them succeed. Tear down regulations that prevent aspiring entrepreneurs from getting the nancing to grow. " [1] 2 Twitter's stock jumped from its initial price of $26 to end the rst day of trading at $44.90 (up 73%). Virtually none of this "pop" was enjoyed by ordinary investors. Instead, as usual, the underwriters hand-selected the fortunate participants from their best (i.e., largest and wealthiest) clients.
from a large number of individuals over the Internet? Even the US' polarized, dysfunctional Congress could see the economic (and political) advantages of promoting this movement. With President Obama leading the way, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) became law on April 5, 2012, 3 its Title III legalizing "securities crowdfunding" for the rst time.
is paper relates securities crowdfunding to the recent phenomenon of crowdsourcing, considers the problems faced by start-up and small businesses when attempting to raise capital, identi es why it was illegal to engage in securities crowdfunding in the US until the JOBS Act, critiques that law, and o ers thoughts about its likely success.
THE GENESIS OF SECURITIES CROWDFUNDING-CROWDSOURCING
Crowdsourcing is "a type of participative online activity in which [a party] proposes to a group of individuals … via a exible open call … the voluntary undertaking of a task." It derives from the micro nance movement pioneered by the 2006 Nobel Laureate Mohammed Yunus, who (with his Grameen Bank) has, over the past 30 years, microloaned over $9 billion to individuals in ird World countries to enable them to launch or expand their enterprises. [4] e 2008 nancial crisis led to the extension of this idea to charities, although the model inverted: Instead of a few providing small amounts to a large number, a large number provide small amounts to a few. From there crowdsourcing (now o en called "crowdfunding") evolved to support artists and nance innovative products. Contributors receive a token of appreciation (e.g., a poster for the crowdfunded movie) or one of the rst items resulting from the crowdfunded production operation (either free or at a substantial discount).
ese represent three of the ve crowdfunding models: 1) donation-based, 2) reward-based and 3) prepurchase. [6, 7] eir success has been impressive. For example, Kickstarter raised $250 billion from two million people in 2012. [5] Pebble Technology, wanted to build smartwatches (which pair with smartphones). It o ered a free watch to those who contributed at least $115. e funding goal was $100,000. In a day $1 million was raised; in ve weeks, $10.3 million. [8] Before long, entrepreneurs began to look to the "crowd" for more conventional nancing: debt and equity investment. A fourth type of crowdfunding appeared: zero-interest lending, in which the public provides noninterest-bearing loans to new or small businesses. In 2011 $1 billion was generated, and pundits predict as much as $5 billion within a few years. [2] Note that these loans have a donative avor because there is no interest. at formulation resulted from the fear of violating US lawany "investment" that generates a "return" is a "security," subjecting it to onerous regulation. e stage was set, however, for the h model-securities crowdfunding: soliciting pro t-seeking debt and equity investments from the general public (discussed shortly).
THE PLIGHT OF SMALL BUSINESSES AND START-UPS
Entrepreneurs involved in small businesses and startups typically seek capital from: 1) personal resources, 2) friends and family, 3) banks, and 4) venture capitalists and business angels. Such entrepreneurs o en have inadequate personal resources to launch or expand their enterprises. Friends and family can only provide limited assistance. Before the 2008 nancial crisis, banks were usually unwilling to lend absent the entrepreneur having signi cant collateral because of the weak track record of economic success, a situation that worsened in the crisis' a ermath. Venture capitalists and business angels not only typically eschew the kinds of small, early-stage investments such entrepreneurs seek, they also tend to restrict their involvement to certain high-density zones of innovation, such as the Silicon Valley and New York City. Indeed, research indicates that the radius of involvement could be as little as 70 miles, [7] which is particularly troublesome for rural ventures. [2] us, many entrepreneurs are unable to turn their ideas into reality or to enable their businesses to reach their full potential, all arguably to the detriment of general economic growth and job formation.
In response to this thirst for capital, securities crowdfunding has begun to appear elsewhere in the world, with governments occasionally taking notice but thus far remaining hesitant to intervene. [6] In the US, however, the SEC has reacted promptly to stop such activities. For example, in 2011 two individuals used the Internet to solicit equity investors to purchase a well-known brewery. ey received pledges for $200 million from ve million individuals. Upon becoming aware of this attempt at securities crowdfunding, the SEC brought it to an abrupt halt. [2] e problem: A pro t-seeking opportunity o ered to the public is subject to US securities regulation, which prohibits general solicitation.
SECURITIES CROWDFUNDING VS. US SECURITIES LAW
A er the stock market crash of 1929, the US's historical laissez-faire policy toward the capital markets came under severe scrutiny. e two core US securities laws resulted: the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. e former regulates IPOs; the latter regulates secondary securities sales. 4 e 1933 Act is of direct relevance to securities crowdfunding. e SEC's mandate is to promote the "public interest" in the capital markets. e primary goal is investor protection. e additional goals are to "promote e ciency, competition, and capital formation." [9] With respect to IPOs, the following rule from the 1933 Act is intended to achieve those goals: "Unless a registration statement is in e ect …, it shall be unlawful" to sell, o er to sell, buy, or o er to buy any "security" in the US. [10] "Security" includes traditional stocks and bonds, as well as a powerful catchall-"investment contracts," [11] which the US Supreme Court de ned as an arrangement "whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect pro ts [primarily through] the e orts of … a third-party." [12] An equity interest sold via securities crowdfunding (regardless of how labeled 5 ) is an "investment contract." e Internet is being used to induce the public to pool its resources to support an activity (i.e., there is an "invest[ment] in a common enterprise"), expecting to pro t primarily through the e orts of the solicitor of those funds (i.e., "a third-party"). Since the arrangement constitutes a "security," buying, selling, or o ering to buy or sell the interest is illegal unless "a registration statement is in e ect." e production of a registration statement (which must be approved by the SEC) is burdensome. It can take months and cost several hundred thousand dollars.
e registration statement contains extensive disclosures about the business, its principals, the potential risks, and numerous additional matters. It also includes audited nancial statements. Lawyers, bankers, accountants, and others are involved. Given the comparatively small amount typically sought by start-up and small business entrepreneurs, the ratio of transaction costs to proceeds is prohibitively high (and the delay alone can thwart a business plan). is is not a problem only for very small-scale entrepreneurs. ere are other circumstances in which, given the relatively modest amount sought (e.g., $5 million), the transaction costs of producing a registration statement are deemed too high. As a result, Congress authorized the SEC to carve out exemptions from the registration requirement:
◆ -Required: O ering circular (i.e., a culled-down version of the registration statement) -Problem: e exemption is not useful because the cost of preparing the document, while less, is still prohibitive given the small amount being sought by start-up or small businesses us, none of the pre-existing exemptions from the registration requirement apply to securities crowdfunding.
THE NEW CROWDFUNDING EXEMPTION
In 2011 the SEC chair said: "I recently asked the sta to take a fresh look at our [securities] o ering rules in light of changes in the operation of the markets, advances in technology and the acceleration in the pace of communications. I also requested that the sta think creatively about what the SEC can do to encourage capital formation, particularly for small businesses, while maintaining important investor protections." [17] Later that year legislation to establish a securities crowdfunding exemption was introduced, culminating in the JOBS Act in April 2012. It required the SEC to produce implementation rules by the end of 2012. Unfortunately, the dra rules (known as Regulation Crowdfunding) did not appear until October 2013. ey circulated for public consideration until February 2014, with over 250 comments being received. It appears that the SEC will be unable to produce nal rules until late 2014.
Frustrated with the SEC's delays, four states enacted securities crowdfunding provisions, 8 but these are of little value since they require both the company and the offerees to be same-state residents. Very few entrepreneurs have thus far used the state options (perhaps 30). [18] As it stands, securities crowdfunding will be accomplished by "issuers" (i.e., those seeking to raise debt and/ 6 ere are 50 states in the US (e.g., New York, California, Texas). or equity capital through the issuance of securities) who will work with SEC-registered intermediaries that will: 1) post on their webpages descriptions of the securities being o ered, and 2) provide a "communication channel" (analogous to a chat room) for the issuer and interested investors to post comments, questions, etc. e intermediaries' webpages will be visible by anyone, but only the issuer and those who open an "account" with the intermediary will be able to post (thereby introducing an element of accountability into the communication stream).
ere are two kinds of intermediary: "brokers" and a new form, "funding portals." A "broker" is a "person engaged in the business of e ecting transactions in securities for the account of others." [19] A "funding portal" is a "person acting as an intermediary in a transaction involving the o er or sale of securities for the account of others, solely pursuant to" the new exemption.
[20] Brokers are full-service nancial professionals who are permitted to give investment advice, pay referral fees, and hold and manage investors' funds and securities. Funding portals are permitted to do none of these things. ey can only list (without substantive commentary) issuers' o erings and provide "communication channels." Brokers and funding portals will charge a fee (amount unknown as yet) for these two basic services. Brokers will charge additional fees for the other permissible services.
Issuers can raise up to $1 million annually using the new exemption.
[21] Investors will be limited in the annual amount they can put at risk [22] : ◆ ose whose income and net worth are both less than $100,000 can invest the greater of: 5% of the larger of the two, or $2000 ◆ All other investors can invest the greater of:
10% of the larger of the two, or $100,000 e issuer will be required to: [23] ◆ Provide disclosures at the outset, including: -Name, legal status, address and website -Names of directors and o cers, along with their business experience during the past three years -Names of shareholders holding more than 20% of the voting power ("20% shareholders") -How the interests of investors might be undermined as a result of the rights held, or actions that might be taken, by the issuer, its directors, o cers and 20% shareholders -Amount intended to be raised ("target o ering amount"), the deadline for reaching it, 9 and whether contributions in excess will be accepted -Intended use of the funds -Description of the business, the business plan, and scaled nancial disclosures: ◆ Target o ering amount $100,000 or less: ■ Most recent income tax return ■ Financial statements certi ed by the CEO 9 e issuer must provide timely, ongoing updates on progress in obtaining "investment commitments" in that amount.
to be true and complete in all material respects ◆ Target o ering amount $100,001 to $500,000: Financial statements reviewed by a certi ed public accountant (CPA) 10 ◆ Target o ering amount $500,001 to $1,000,000: Audited nancial statements -Security price (or the price-setting methodology) ◆ Provide ongoing annual disclosures: A host of information related to prospects and performance, including nancial statements certi ed, reviewed or audited pursuant to the above rules e intermediary will be required to: [25] ◆ Prohibit any direct investment by itself (or its directors or o cers) in the issuer (to avoid con icts of interest) ◆ Perform background checks on the issuer's directors, o cers and 20% shareholders ◆ Make reasonable e orts to ensure that the issuer is complying with the exemption's requirements (the intermediary may accept the issuer's representations that it is in compliance, unless circumstances indicate that such reliance is unwarranted) ◆ Remove any o ering if it appears that the issuer or the o ering itself presents the potential for fraud or otherwise raises concerns about investor protection ◆ Provide educational materials to investors, including: -How the security acquisition process works, emphasizing the investor's right to cancel its investment commitment any time prior to 48 hours before the funding deadline -e risks associated with the investment, taking care to ensure that the investor understands: ◆ e high risk associated with start-up and small businesses in general ◆ e risk that the entire investment may be lost (the investor must represent that it is able to bear such loss) ◆ e risk that there may ultimately be no market for the security a er acquisition and that, as a general rule, the security cannot be disposed of for one year 11 ◆ Ensure that no investor exceeds its annual investment limit (the intermediary may accept the investor's representations that it is in compliance, unless circumstances indicate that such reliance is unwarranted)
◆ Not permit investor funds to reach the issuer unless the target o ering amount has been achieved (if it is not achieved, all investor funds must be returned) ◆ Ensure that no securities are issued until at least 21 days a er the issuer has provided the required disclosures (thereby providing at least three weeks for the "crowd" to digest the disclosures and express its "wisdom" as to the investment's merits) ◆ Disclose how it is being compensated
DOES THE NEW SECURITIES CROWDFUNDING EXEMPTION MAKES SENSE?
e SEC acknowledged its dilemma in Regulation Crowdfunding: "We understand that these proposed rules … could signi cantly a ect the viability of crowdfunding as a capital-raising method for startups and small businesses. Rules that are unduly burdensome could discourage participation [.] Rules that are too permissive, however, may increase the risks for individual investors, thereby undermining the facilitation of capital raising for [these] businesses."
On the whole, commentators look negatively upon the securities crowdfunding exemption-and for good reason.
Transaction Costs
e securities law emphasizes the disclosure of all material information (and the preclusion of any material omissions) as its primary means of safeguarding investors. Re ecting that policy, the JOBS Act and Regulation Crowdfunding impose substantial disclosure requirements on issuers, both at the outset and on an on-going basis. ese disclosures come at a cost; and at some point, that cost is so large as a proportion of the funding raised that the economic arrangement becomes nonsensical.
at appears to be the case here. e SEC estimates the initial cost for o erings at the $100,000 level to be $15,000 (15%); $500,000 could cost $63,000 (13%); $1 million might cost $149,000 (15%). Worse, a large proportion of these costs 12 would have to be pre-funded by the entrepreneur-the very person deemed so illiquid as to require the creation of the securities crowdfunding exemption in the rst place. It would seem likely that most entrepreneurs will nd prohibitive both the amount and timing of these costs. Add to this the ongoing annual disclosure costs, which in many cases will include nancial statement reviews or audits. As one commentator said, "equity crowdfunding … has the worst 'bang for your buck' in all of corporate nance." [26] Liability Beyond disproportionately heavy transaction costs, the liability provisions will make intermediaries and issuers think twice about utilizing the securities crowdfunding 12 Probably all costs other than the intermediary's fee (e.g., nancial statement audits, and the estimated $6000 cost to prepare the SEC paperwork).
exception. e JOBS Act permits investors to sue to recover their investment if the issuer "by any means of … written or oral communication, in the o ering or sale of a security makes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact required to be stated … in order to make the statements … not misleading [.] " [27] Information is "material" if "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance [to it] in determining whether to purchase the security[.]" [28] ere are only two defenses: 1) the purchaser knew about the material misrepresentation, and 2) the issuer can prove it "did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of [the] untruth or omission." [29] Even an innocent (i.e., merely negligent) material misrepresentation subjects the issuer to this liability. It should be expected that well-intentioned, but unsophisticated, entrepreneurs will innocently, but misleadingly, dra some portion of the bevy of disclosures required for participation in securities crowdfunding; or will make amateurish mistakes in the intermediary's chat room when touting their o erings or responding to questions and comments. If a "reasonable investor would attach importance" to the matter innocently misrepresented, the issuer can be compelled to return the entirety of the investors' contributions. In short order issuers will come to realize that avoiding this liability will require seeking professional advice in advance, signi cantly increasing the pre-funded cost to utilize the exemption.
"Issuer" is de ned to include "any person who o ers to sell the security[;]" [30] and in Regulation Crowdfunding the SEC said, "it appears likely that intermediaries … would be considered issuers for purposes of this liability provision." is somewhat surprising statement means that intermediaries will need to undertake costly due diligence to ensure that they can raise the defense that they "did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of [the] untruth or omission." It does not appear that the SEC included this enhanced duediligence cost when deriving its estimate of intermediary fees. us, the already high expected transaction costs are probably greater than indicated in the SEC's projections. Intermediaries will certainly pass these additional costs on to issuers in the form of higher fees.
Remedies
One must also wonder whether investors will be able to recover their losses should the issuer commit fraud or engage in material misrepresentation. e most any issuer can be liable for is $1 million (the maximum amount the investors as a whole can provide the issuer).
[31] Investors will have individually contributed comparatively small amounts, amounts far too low to warrant engaging an attorney to press a legal action. e typical response to such a situation in the US is to form a class-action lawsuit, compensating the attorney with contingent fees of 20-40% of the damages recovered. However, given the up-front cost to bring such an action and the relatively low poten-13 e SEC uses $400 per hour as its estimate of the cost of legal services. tial payout to the attorneys, it seems unlikely that lawyers will be willing to take on such suits. us, it seems probable that investors will usually be unable to redress their grievances against fraudulent or materially misrepresenting issuers through private actions.
Even if an attorney can be found to take on the class action, if an allegation of fraud is made, the investors face hurdles under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. It requires investors to identify the speci c facts which demonstrate scienter (i.e., intent to do harm) on the part of the issuer, as well as to identify the speci c facts which show that the investors' losses directly resulted from the issuer's intentional actions. ese are frequently insuperable obstacles.
Later Funding Rounds
Issuers using securities crowdfunding will discover that, if their ventures are successful, obtaining additional rounds of nancing will be more di cult. Among the last things venture capitalists and business angels want to deal with is a large number of unsophisticated, potentially unruly equityholders. eir presence typically impedes the quality and speed of decision-making, and increases the possibility of equityholder disputes which can disrupt the company's management.
In addition, if the issuer's equityholder registry is not maintained with great accuracy, potential providers of later-round funding may be disinclined to participate because it may be overly di cult to determine who actually holds an equity interest in the company, making it a challenge to secure equityholder consent to various major actions the venture capitalist or business angels believe the entity should take.
us, the entrepreneur initially grateful for seed or expansion capital may come to regret its decision when subsequent funding rounds become necessary.
"Terrible" Investments
A question thus far unasked is: What is the probable quality of the investments that will be funded through the new securities crowdfunding exemption? Investments in start-up and small businesses are well known to be exceptionally risky, with most failing (or proving so nonremunerative as to not warrant keeping them in existence) within in a few years. e entrepreneurs seeking to utilize securities crowdfunding will o en be those who have not been able to access capital through conventional sources (banks, venture capitalists and business angels) because: 1) they lack collateral and/or a successful economic track record; and 2) startup and early-stage ventures are, as just noted, so notoriously risk-laden.
Even businesses funded by venture capitalists and business angels fail 90% of the time, despite an average of 1200 hours of due diligence by persons generally familiar with the industry involved. Were it not for the 10% of investments that are exceptionally pro table (and which are held pursuant to a deliberate diversi cation strategy-one most small investors may not pursue), even expert funders would lose money. Why expect better results from businesses pruned out by such professionals during their due-diligence process? [5] In addition, the average securities crowdfunding investor typically will: 1) have no background in business or investment matters, 2) have little or no real knowledge of the industry, 3) be unwilling to spend meaningful amounts of time performing due diligence, and 4) not properly diversify. ese persons will also tend to be among those least able to comfortably absorb the losses they are almost certain to su er.
Beyond the dismal prospects for success, both the Internet and small business investment are widely understood to be vulnerable to fraudsters. Joining the two would seem to amplify the risk that investors will come away empty-handed.
As one commentator said, " [T] here is no way to rescue [securities] crowdfunding. e problem is not with how Congress set up the system or how the SEC will eventually implement it. e problem is that this was always a terrible idea." [5] 
THE YEARS AHEAD
Given the recent passage of the JOBS Act and the hype and mystique surrounding securities crowdfunding, it seems improbable that either the SEC or Congress will acknowledge the problems with the new exemption and take appropriate remedial action at this time. e SEC will nalize Regulation Crowdfunding toward the end of 2014 and securities crowdfunding will "go live" in the US.
Brokers may well not be interested in acting as intermediaries because of the low fee potential and the disproportionate risks. Funding portals will undoubtedly arise, but will shortly discover that they are subject to liabilities so substantial that, given the practical limits on the fees they can charge, the business model may not be viable.
Issuers will rush to list their proposals, but probably for amounts below $100,000 to avoid having to prefund costly nancial statement reviews and audits. Many will get nanced, but in a year or two the media will begin reporting a cascade of lawsuits and accusations as amateur investors attempt to hold amateur business persons accountable for relatively innocent mistakes in language and business judgment. To the extent disgruntled investors can induce attorneys to take on their actions, issuers will discover the downside of equity securities crowdfunding-protracted distraction and the emotional and nancial cost of defending under the exemption's negligencethreshold liability provision.
Investors will ock to fund, over time coming to realize that the odds of real, breakout nancial success are more akin to playing the lottery than to "investment." As a group they could become wiser about nancial matters, which may help them engage in more conventional, less risky investments. If the exemption survives, they may become more capable of performing due diligence, although they will almost certainly conclude that, given the small amounts involved, it is not cost-e ective to do so to any signi cant extent-bringing into question the entire premise that the "crowd" will, through its collective "wisdom," make quality investment decisions.
It seems plausible that donation-based, reward-based and prepurchase crowdfunding will prosper. Non-interest-bearing lending through crowdfunding also shows promise. But the crowdfunding of securities seems to make no economic sense. Transaction costs will be disproportionately high, the likelihood of venture (and therefore investment) success is very low, fraud will shake investors' con dence, and intermediaries and investors will become disenchanted by the unexpected liabilities to which they nd themselves subject.
It does not seem possible to cost-e ectively regulate securities crowdfunding. ere is no way to bring the transaction costs imposed by a useful regulatory regime down to a level that makes sense given the small amounts of capital sought to be raised. Perhaps a di erent model for dealing with securities crowdfunding should be considered-one analogous to the regulation of gambling (where, statistically speaking, everyone is going to lose; but those partaking generally do not feel put upon by their losses because they understand the "realities" and they simply enjoy the experience). In that environment the primary regulatory thrust would be fraud prevention, not costly disclosure. Transaction costs would decline dramatically, making participation by issuers rational. However, investors would need to truly take to heart the extremely speculative nature of the undertaking and cease thinking of their contributions as "investments."
